How do individuals evaluate their performance? We conjecture that round numbers in performance scales act as reference points and predict that performing just short of them motivates people to improve in the future. We find substantial and significant evidence of this in how batting averages influence professional baseball players, SAT scores impact retaking decisions by high school students, and laboratory participants react to hypothetical scenarios. * Both authors contribute equally, order of authorship was determined with a coin-toss (Devin accurately predicted heads).
Where do reference points come from? Previous research has shown that goals (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999; Larrick, Heath, & Wu, 2009) , expectations (Feather, 1969; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) and counterfactuals (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Medvec, Gilovich, & Madey, 1995; Medvec & Savitsky, 1997) , among others, can all act as reference points when evaluating outcomes.
We hypothesize that because round numbers are "cognitive reference points" in numerical scales (Rosch, 1975) , they also act as reference points in the process of subjectively judging outcomes. We conjecture that as a consequence, performing just short of a round number motivates future improvement more than performing just above it does.
We test this notion studying professional baseball players and SAT takers. As predicted, we find that those performing just short of a round number are more driven to improve their performance. The effects we document are significant both statistically and in practical terms. For example, baseball players with a batting average of .299 before the last play of the season are almost twice as likely to hit the ball on that last play relative to players with a .300 average. Similarly, high school students are approximately 20% more likely to retake the SAT if their total score ends in 90 (e.g. 1190) than the most proximate 00 (e.g. 1200). We obtain similar findings in a scenario experiment that rules out alternative explanations for the field studies.
The studies of (Medvec & Savitsky, 1997) and (Heath et al., 1999) are the closest to the current research. The former shows that participants report greater satisfaction imagining barely meeting a category of performance than comfortably exceeding it. The latter argues that explicitly set goals act as reference points which, among other consequences, lead to greater expressed motivation for improvement when people are just short of meeting a goal.
We contribute to these findings by demonstrating that a round number -a "goal" that has not been explicitly set and which is not attached to a direct consequence -is a powerful motivator of behavior both inside and outside the laboratory.
STUDY 1: BASEBALL PLAYERS

Method
Study 1 examines the behavior of professional baseball players. In addition to sports' general advantage of having readily available performance data that players themselves are likely to pay attention to, baseball has the additional advantage of possessing a particularly salient measure of performance that varies with great granularity: batting average. † We examine how players respond to their season batting average being just below relative to just above a round number. For ease of exposition, we refer to performance that is exactly equal to a round number as being above it.
We test two predictions that arise from the hypothesis that round numbers act as motivating goals: (1) fewer than expected players end the season just below a round number and more than expected above it, and (2) players that are very close to a round number as the season is ending adjust their behavior to ensure ending it above it. † Batting average is the number of times a player has successfully hit the ball divided by the number of at bats. The Baseball Almanac refers to it as "easily the most common statistic in baseball and the most understood" (http://www.baseball-almanac.com/stats.shtml).
To test these predictions we obtained baseball data from Retrosheet.com. These data contain play-by-play results for all players in Major League Baseball from 1975 to
2008.
‡ To ensure having a sufficiently granular batting average we restrict our sample to players who had at least 200 at bats during the season (reducing overall sample from 11,430 player-seasons to 8,817). Batting averages for professional baseball players are almost never below .200 or above .400, so we focus on batting averages around .300, the most round number in that range.
Results
Most of our statistical analyses employ the full range of batting averages in the data, however, for ease of exposition, we graphically present results in the .280 to .320 range (N=3,083 season*player observations). 
Discussion
Overall, the performance of baseball players proves consistent with the notion that a round number, a batting average of .300, can act as a goal and influence behavior. The baseball analyses have two notable limitations: (1) there is only one relevant round number, and (2) players' actions to improve performance take place on the last plays of the seasons and hence have relatively minor consequences. Our next study seeks to address both limitations.
STUDY 2: SAT RE-TAKERS
Method
The SAT is a standardized test for college admissions in the United States. Until 2006 (and for the entirety of our sample period), SATs were scored between 400 and 1600 in intervals of 10. Students are allowed to retake the test and a high proportion of them do (about 50%, according to (Vigdor & Clotfelter, 2003) The dataset only includes the score and date of the students' last test ever taken and it does not include information on whether the student has taken the test before.
Hence, we do not directly observe which students retook the SAT. Instead, as we describe in detail below, our analyses identify retaking rates by looking at the SAT-score distributions for juniors and seniors. Juniors or seniors account for 99.5% of the data, so we focus on these two groups only.
Results and Discussion
Test Retaking
Figure 3 plots the distribution of SAT scores separately for juniors and seniors.
The distribution of juniors is centered to the right of seniors, indicating that, on average, juniors (who did not retake the SAT as seniors) did better on the SAT than seniors did.
We are mostly interested in gaps in the frequency of scores around round numbers for juniors (as compared to seniors). *** Figure 3 ***
The majority of seniors that take the test do not have a chance to receive their scores and then retake the SAT before they send out their college applications and as would be expected the distribution of their scores is smooth. While these gaps in the distribution of juniors' scores are apparent to the naked eye for most round numbers above 700 in the figure, they appear to be smaller for scores further from 1000. These visual comparisons are misleading, however, because the baseline upon which they occur is also getting smaller as one moves away from 1000.
To account for this, Figure 4 plots the ratio of relative frequencies between consecutive scores (the slope of the density function). For example, in line with the numbers from the example of SAT=1000 vs. SAT=990 discussed above, Figure 4 shows that the ratio of relative frequencies for juniors at 1000 is 1.11 while the same ratio for seniors is 1.00. The figure shows sizeable gaps at every round number between 900 and 1500, with those between 1000 and 1400 being particularly large. From 1390 to 1400, for example, the ratio of relative frequencies for juniors is 1.08 while that of seniors is .89. *** Figure 4*** As mentioned above, the previous comparisons suffer from the problem that the distribution of seniors peaks before that of juniors. A simple way around this problem is to exploit the fact that for scores above 1000 one expects the frequency of juniors to drop as the score is increased (e.g. that there should be fewer juniors with a score of 1250 than with a score of 1240).
We can hence conduct a conservative test of the notion that scoring just short of a round number increases the odds of retaking by testing the null that at a round number the relative frequency of students getting that score is the same as getting the immediately lower score. We do this with a simple difference of proportions tests for these two contiguous frequencies and assess whether we reject the null that these two proportions are equal.
For example, there are 1,656 more juniors with a score of 1100 than with a score of 1090 (P 1100= 1.74%, P 1090 =1.60%, Z=8.61, p<.001), which we interpret as favoring the notion that falling short of 1100 provided greater motivation to retake the SAT than getting 1100 did. Analogous conservative calculations reject the null for 1200, 1300 and 1400, all p's<.001.
In sum, we find a systematic pattern consistent with students being more likely to retake an exam if their score is just short of a round number. We interpret this as evidence of SAT takers using round numbers as implicit goals for performance.
A related though alternative account involves test takers, either correctly or incorrectly, believing that surpassing a round number disproportionately increases their odds of being admitted to college or of receiving financial aid. This is not implausible considering that, (i) universities and scholarships often do impose minimum SAT thresholds for consideration (although not as high as 1300 or 1400) and (ii) the admission process has a considerable component of subjective judgment that may respond to round numbers as well.
While this account is very closely related to the notion that SAT takers use round numbers as goals (it proposes SAT evaluators do), we attempt to tease apart the two in the next subsection and follow with Study 3 that rules out such concerns by design.
Score Sending
The dataset that we use contains information about the colleges to which students send their scores. We use this information to indirectly study whether they believe that a score just short of a round number is disproportionately worse than a score just above it.
Intuitively, if they did, the set of schools to which they send their scores would differ.
To measure the quality of schools to which scores are sent, we first compute the average SAT score sent to each school by all applicants in the sample. We then compute the mean of these school averages for the set of schools where each applicant sent scores.
In short, we use the average SAT score of other students who sent their scores to such schools as a proxy for the quality of schools to which a given test taker chooses to apply. § § This measure correlates highly with that provided by the US News and World Report rank of top-50 schools for 1998 (the mid-year of our sample), r=.71, p<.0001. Figure 5 shows the average quantity and quality of schools senior SAT scores were sent to as a function of the score obtained. ** Both lines are upward sloping, indicating that students with higher SAT scores apply to more and better schools. More importantly, the figure shows that the quality and quantity of schools scores are sent to increase smoothly as scores pass round numbers. We interpret this as suggesting that round-number scores influence retaking decisions because of their motivating effect towards improvement, rather than because of their direct impact on the beliefs of the outcomes students can obtain with such scores.
Admission decisions
Figure 5 provides indirect evidence suggesting test takers do not believe their odds of admission change discontinuously by passing a round number. Data on admission decisions are required to assess if these beliefs are correct. While there is no centralized dataset of admission decisions across universities, one of the authors of this paper has used admissions data from two institutions in previous (and completely unrelated) work and we use those data here to partially address this question.
The first dataset is from a highly competitive private university for which just over 1100 undergraduate admission decisions are available. We estimate regressions with the admission decision as the dependent variable and with dummy variables for SAT scores as key predictors, controlling for other academic characteristics of the applicants (intuitively, we obtain conditional average admission probabilities for different SAT scores). We test the null that the probability of admission changes by the same amount for a given increase in SAT from just below and from just above a round number (e.g., ** We must analyze score sending behavior by seniors because the sample of juniors has selection bias; we only observe school choices by students who felt their score was high enough not to merit re-taking the test. that probability of admission increases by the same when going from 1390 to 1400, as when going from 1400 to 1410). This is a conservative test because we expect higher scores to have smaller marginal effects on admission decisions. † † We test this null for scores around 1200, 1300, 1400, and 1500 and fail to reject the null for all four scores (N's=55, 97, 144 and 87 respectively, p-values=.96, .99, .20 and .92 respectively).
The second dataset is from a business school and hence consists of GMAT rather than SAT scores. We tested the equivalent null for scores around 600 and 700 (the maximum in the GMAT is 800) and also failed to reject the null (N's=3,432 and 1,404
respectively, p-values=.09, .93 respectively).
In sum, the admissions data suggest that probability of admission does not discretely change as scores pass round numbers, and the score-sending data suggests that students behave accordingly. Our next and final study is a scenario experiment that 
Method and Procedure
This study was part of a sequence of unrelated experiments conducted at a behavioral laboratory in exchange for a flat payment fee. It was computer-based and presented each participant with three scenarios, always in the same order (N=172). † † Due to the small sample size we collapse contiguous scores, e.g. one dummy for SAT=1380 or SAT=1390.
In each scenario participants were presented with a situation that included feedback on partial performance and they were asked how motivated they thought they would be to improve upon it. The sole manipulation in the study was the level of partial performance. Each scenario had a 3 (distance-from-round-number: far below, just-below, just-above) x 2 (round-number: low, high) design
To ensure a between-subject design, each participant was assigned to the same condition for all three scenarios (e.g., a participant would be given partial performance measures that were far below the low round number for all three scenarios).
The scenarios were: Respondents answered these questions employing 1-9 Likert Scales.
Results and Discussion
We present results for the average 1-9 score given by each participant to all three scenarios as the dependent variable (M=6.34, SD=1.45, MIN=2.3, MAX=9) . The results are shown in Figure 6 . The fact that the round-number level did not influence motivation indicates that participants were not making inferences about overall effort or exhaustion based on that level, further suggesting they respond to distance from a round number because of its motivating effect rather than because of other inferences.
CONCLUSIONS
The present paper shows that round numbers in performance scales act as goals which more strongly motivate performance improvements among those performing just below vs. just above them. These findings contribute to the literature on reference points in at least two ways. First, they propose a new source of reference points that are naturally occurring and present in many different situations, and second, they provide often difficult to obtain evidence that reference points matter for real-life decisions.
We believe that round numbers acting as goals lead to at least two interesting questions for future research. The first is how these implicit goals, round numbers, interact with explicitly set ones. It is common for explicit goals to be set at round numbers; if round numbers are goals even without incentives, could it be that explicit ‡ ‡ If the scenarios are analyzed separately the qualitative pattern of results is observed in all three; they are statistically significant for scenarios 1 and 2 (p's<.001) but not for scenario 3 (p=.4).
goals set at other numbers would lead to greater overall motivation? For instance, if people would naturally want to lose 30 pounds, would it be more effective to set an explicit goal at losing 33 rather than 30 pounds? Or is it the case that explicit goals are particularly effective if they are combined with implicit ones?
Another question for future research is the precise mechanism by which round numbers are motivating. One possibility is that people performing below a round number subjectively assess the odds of better performance in the future as greater (a judgmentmediated effect). Another possibility is that performing short of a round number is simply disproportionately aversive (a utility-mediated effect). 1.40%
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